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ABSTRACT

WATER TREATMENT AND DISTRIBUTION SIMULATION FOR A SCADA
SECURITY TESTBED
Kyle Moss
July 24th, 2012

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are used in almost
all industrial processes including use in the nation's critical infrastructure. The electric,
water, and gas industries are merely a few that rely heavily on the use of SCADA
systems in order to provide reliable service to the public. Any disruption in these systems
would lead to major issues in day to day life and could produce a hazardous environment
until the services are restored. SCADA equipment was first implemented decades ago,
and in some cases the equipment deployed at that time is still in use today. As network
technology emerged and advanced over the last several years, SCADA systems were
adapted in order to provide network access and control from remote locations. This led
to vulnerabilities in limiting access to the system and provided a means for hackers,
hactavist, and nation-states to gain control of critical infrastructure SCADA systems in
order to cause both physical and economical damage.
New technologies and research areas have emerged in an effort to thwart these
possible intrusions and attacks. However, there is a need to have adequate means of
IV

testing new security devices since it would be impractical to test on a functioning
SCADA system. This leads to the development of simulations and testbeds that can
provide a low-cost, easily configurable means of testing new cyber security devices.
A water treatment and distribution simulation was developed in order to provide
this means of testing. The simulation encompasses two components. The first is a
software simulation that provides virtualized components typically found in water
systems such as pumps, valves, and water tanks. The second is a hardware component
that provides an interface from the software to actual SCADA equipment such as remote
terminal units and human machine interfaces. The simulation was tested with a prototype
cyber security device to ensure functionality. Attacks were carried out on the SCADA
system with and without the security device in place. The simulation allowed for both a
virtualized and physical response to the attacks. The simulation provided a robust, costeffective testbed for verifying the functionality of the security device.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Modem day processes are automatically controlled by computer systems.

A

combination of embedded systems, sensors, and software are used to increase efficiency
and decrease cost.

Almost all industrial processes, from electricity production and

distribution, water treatment and distribution, transportation, oil and gas pipelines, and
even the financial industry use Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems. SCADA systems allow for accurate monitoring of the overall process in nearreal time for many cases, and allow operators to control and monitor systems at remote
sites.
As new technologies have emerged, the use of remote monitoring and random
access to the SCADA system by multiple operators and departments within a utility has
increased the vulnerability of the system to cyber attacks.

SCADA technology is

expensive to deploy so components in the system are rarely upgraded. Many legacy
systems have controllers and communication systems that are approaching 30 years old;
designed in a time that cyber attacks were not an issue, which leaves them extremely
vulnerable.

More modem systems that utilize IP based communication techniques

implement firewalls in order to provide a separation between the business local area
network (LAN) and SCADA LAN. However many times the firewalls are configured
inappropriately, with ports opened in order to allow remote access into the SCADA
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network. Attackers are then able to exploit the holes in the firewall and gain access to the
SCADA side through the business network. It is also important to note that security risks
come from both outside threats, such as nation states, hacker groups, and independent
hackers, as well as insider threats such as disgruntled employees.
In 2010, one of the most successful and highly noted attacks on a SCADA system
was discovered.

STUXNET used a rootkit to infect Siemens programmable logic

controllers (PLCs) in Iranian nuclear facilities.

The worm traversed Windows based

operating systems until it found specific controllers configured with variable frequency
drives and eventually caused severe damage to uranium enrichment centrifuges. The
worm exploited three zero-day vulnerabilities [1].
For these reasons, there has been an increased push for research and development
in the area of SCADA security. The University of Louisville is currently working on a
field device security preprocessor using a microkemel running on a Gumstix® embedded
processor [2]. The research efforts are focused on adding security to legacy systems used
in the water sector.

Other university labs, government labs, and private sector

organizations are also performing research in this area.
A challenge for those testing devices that are under development arises because it
would be impractical, and possibly extremely hazardous, to test the units on a functioning
SCADA system. In the water sector, for example, errors in the hardware could lead to
lose of control in the SCADA system or inability to collect data from remote sensors.
Even more dangerous, the device could lead to damage of pumps, values, and water lines
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in the system leaving the area without consumable water for an extended period. For this
reason it is necessary to have a test bed for developing security devices.
In this thesis, the design and development of a water treatment and distribution
simulation will be discussed. The simulation incorporates both software and hardware to
mimic a water system and interfaces to a remote terminal unit (RTU) similar to those
used in an actual process.

By using a software-based approach to simulate a water

system, there is not a need to purchase expensive hardware to test the prototype in
development. A software simulation also allows for easy reconfiguration of the system.
This research is directly for use with the hardened remote terminal unit security
pre-processor currently being developed at the University of Louisville. The security
device is considered a "bump in the wire" approach, being connected to the R TU in line
with the MTU/HMI. The simulation provides both a virtual and physical response to
simulated attacks that are carried out on the SCADA network. Figure 1.1 shows a block
diagram of how the simulation software and hardware fit into the system. The individual
components will be discussed in more detail in later chapters.

Water Treatment and
Distribution
Simulation Software

..

RS-232

I t i
~ + I

Windows PC

Master Terminal
Unit(MTU) I Human
Machine Interface
(HMI)

Water Treatment and
Distribution
Simulation Hardware

~

Physical 1/0 Connections

Hardened
Remote
~ODBUS'" Security "MODBUS.
Preprocessor

Remote Terminal
Unit

Figure 1.1: Illustration of Simulation Integration with SCADA Network
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The remaining chapters in the thesis are organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents
an overview of relevant literature in this research area. Chapter 3 presents the model
development for the water sector simulations.

Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the

implementation of the water sector model in both a software and hardware simulation.
Testing and results of the simulation are presented in chapter 6. Finally, conclusions and
future work are discussed in chapter 7 of the thesis.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides an overview of the published literature which is relevant to
this thesis. It is divided into three parts. Part one is an overview of the water treatment
and distribution system; the processes involved, the topology of typical systems, and
standard operations. Part two is an overview of SCADA systems used in the water sector
including the hardware used, communication systems implemented, operator interfaces,
and the cyber threat to these systems. Finally, an overview of existing water simulations
will be presented.

A. Water Treatment and Distribution Systems

Understanding the operation of a water treatment and distribution system is
necessary in order to develop a model simulating their functions.

Although no two

systems are identical, there are many similar functions and components in the systems
regardless of size or geographical location. Water systems involve two main processes,
treatment and distribution. To understand the operations more thoroughly, these two
processes will be discussed separately.

5

1. Water Treatment Process

Water treatment is the process of taking groundwater or surface water from a
stream, lake, or river and removing harmful bacteria, viruses, dirt and other contaminates
in order to provide safe drinking water to the public. The process varies depending on
location and the source of the water, but usually involves five steps: coagulation,
sedimentation, filtration, disinfection, and storage as shown in Figure 2.1.
Coagulation is the process of adding chemicals such as Alum to the water to help
dirt and other particles stick together. As the particles combine together they become
heavier and sink to the bottom of the tank in the sedimentation phase. With the dirt
removed, the water is then passed through a filtration process. Most typically, sand,
gravel, and charcoal are used to filter the water; removing smaller particles that were not
removed during sedimentation.
Chlorine is then added in the disinfection phase in order to kill bacteria and other
microorganisms in the water.

Next, the water is tested to ensure it meets the

Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) standards and then is stored for distribution
into the water system [3].
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Figure 2.1: Water Treatment Process (EPA, 2012)

2. Water Distribution Process

After treatment, the water must be distributed to homes, businesses, and industries
for use. Similar to the treatment process, the distribution system can vary greatly
depending on its size and location, but there are many commonalities with all distribution
systems. A distribution system is comprised of water pipes (lines), storage tanks, pumps,
and valves. The distribution system provides uninterrupted, pressurized drinking water to
the community it serves. Large capacity pumps transport water from the treatment
storage tanks to large elevated water towers or ground tanks throughout the coverage area
using water mains. Once pumped into elevated tanks, gravitational force exerted on the
water pushes the water out into the distribution pipes at a pressure directly related to the
difference in elevation of the water in the tank to the pipe system. The pressurized water
7

travels through the pipes of varying diameter branching off through smaller lines to water
meters and eventually into the customer's building. In certain cases, additional pump
stations may be connected to the distribution lines in order to maintain adequate pressure
in the system. [4].
Each elevated storage tank includes at least two pumps; both are equipped with a
valve that prevents backflow through the pump. An alternating switch attached to both
pumps helps distribute the load on each pump equally over time. The pump which is
scheduled to turn on during the next request is known as the lead pump and the secondary
is known as the lag pump. During operation, the system will call for the lead pump to
turn on when water levels in the tank drop below a set value, known as the lead minimum
level. The pump will fill the tank until it reaches a second set value known as the tank
maximum level. These two limits define the normal operating levels of the tank. In the
event that the lead pump fails to turn on, or the demand for water exceeds the capacity of
the lead pump to fill the tank, the water level in the tank will continue to drop. A lag
pump minimum level is predefined in the system. When the tank reaches that point, the
lag pump will turn on in order to maintain sufficient water in the tank. Once the tank
reaches its maximum level, the pump(s) will shut off.
The water in the storage tanks must flow out into the distribution system to
customers. This is done through various types and sizes of pipes buried underground.
There are two topologies to water distribution pipe lines: branch architecture and loop
architecture. Branch architecture is used in rural distribution where homes and
businesses are widely separated. Large diameter water mains are distributed from the
elevated tanks and smaller diameter pipes branch off into subdivisions or industrial parks.
8

These lines branch into smaller lines, which run to water meters at individual homes and
businesses. This is similar to branches on a tree, their diameter and lengths become
shorter at each branch point.
Loop architecture is used in more densely populated areas utilizing a large
diameter water main that circles the area and loops back into itself. Small lines branch
out of the loop into homes and businesses. Depending on the size of the area, multiple
loops can be used. Figure 2.2 shows a water system with loop architecture for
distribution.

Figure 2.2: Water Distribution System (EPA, 2012)

B. SCADA Systems in Water Sector
1. Hardware
Throughout the treatment and distribution system, SCADA systems are
implemented in order to: control pumps and values, measure and control the addition of
chemicals to the treatment process, and to monitor tank levels and pressure levels.
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Remote terminal units (RTU's) are used to collect sensor data such as tank levels and
operation status of pumps, as well as to control relays, which turn pumps on and off.
Intelligent RTUs are able to do control automatically based on predetermined metrics of
the system but still provide telemetry and in-turn operators maintain control. The RTUs
are programmed to run the system with little input from operators.
In most cases, pumps in a distribution system operate at a constant flow rate
(either on or off), but some systems implement variable frequency drives in order to
regulate the flow of water into storage tanks. Control of the pump' s velocity would be
controlled by the RTU as well. The RTU at each remote site transmits data and the
system status to a master control unit (MTU) usually located at the control center for the
water system. In many situations this is collocated with the treatment facility or
treatment control center.

Valves
Firewall

Master Terminal

_ _ -., 7
::--'-_

--1

Remote Terminal
Unit (RTU)

Pumps

Pressure Meter

Level Meter

Figure 2.3: Typical SCADA System Diagram
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2. Communication
Various communication mediums can be used within a SCADA system. For rural
or large area distribution, radio frequency (RF) based technologies are the most practical
form of communication. These systems use a modern connected to the R TU
communication interface to convert from a digital to analog signal. The output is then
connected to a radio and large antenna to transmit the data to another location. For
metropolitan or smaller service areas, fiber optic, plain old telephone service (POTS), or
IP based communication (Ethernet or Wi-Fi) can be used. Most water systems are unique
and these methods of communication are only a few examples of what may be found.

In addition to various communication medium, there are also many SCADA
protocols. MODBUS is a popular protocol and is one of only a few open protocols.
MOD BUS is an application layer messaging protocol which allows it to operate on any
lower layer architecture and with devices connected on different types of networks or
buses [5]. It operates on a client/server model with the MTU functioning as the server
and the RTU as the client. As previously mentioned, RTUs have the functionality to
control analog and discrete outputs (i.e. turning pumps on/oft) and read sensor data on
both analog and digital inputs (i.e. pressure levels, tank levels). Communication between
the MTU and RTU use a specific set of function codes and other data in a MODBUS
packet. This is outlined in detail in the MODBUS RFC.
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III

ADU
Additional address

Error check

PDU
Figure 2.4: MODBUS Frame Architecture 151
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Read-Only

COi ls
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Read-Write

Input Registers
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Read-Only

Holdmg Registers

16- blt word

Read-Write

Comments
This type of data can be provided by on I 0 system
This type of data can be alterable by an application
program
This type of data can be provided by on I 0 system
This type of data can be alterable by on application
program

Figure 2.5: MODBUS Data Types [51

In its original form, MODBUS utilized RS-232 or RS-485 communication
standards in the transport layer. Legacy systems in the water treatment and distribution
system will probably implement this form.

A TCPIIP version of MODBUS is also

available. Figure 2.6 shows the MODBUS TCP/IP stack.
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Figure 2.6: MODBUS TCP/IP Stack (5(

3. Operator Interface

Once the data is received by the MTU, there is a need to display this information
to operators in the control center. This is done by use of human machine interfaces
(HMI). The HMI provides the operator with the ability to manually turn pumps on and
off and indicates any errors in the system such as low pressure levels. This may indicate a
water main break, or failure of pumps and other devices in the system. In most cases,
data recording devices are attached to the SCADA system to provide a record of
operation. Figure 2.7 shows what a typical water treatment HMI would look like.
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Figure 2.7: Water Treatment RMJ (6(

4. Cyber Vulnerabilities in SCADA Systems
In 2005, a joint meeting of several Congressional Subcommittees was held to

focus on the threat of a cyber attack on SCADA systems. At that meeting, experts,
including government officials, national lab scientist, and other experts in the field,
testified about the serious threat that was posed to critical infrastructure.

Dr. Sam

Varnado, Director of Information Operations Center at Sandia National Lab, outlined
some of the research they were conducting using a Red Team approach. At that time
several vulnerabilities in SCADA systems were uncovered [7].
In most cases, cyber threats are classified into one of the following categories:

insider intentional threats, internal unintentional threats, external nontargeted threats, or
malicious actors [8]. Insider intentional threats are those that occur from individuals
working inside the utility, or those who have an expansive knowledge of the SCADA
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system. An example of this type of attack occurred in Queensland, Australia in 2000 in
which 800,000 liters of raw sewage was intentionally discharged from a wastewater
treatment plant into local parks and rivers. Vitek Boden, a previous employee of the
company that installed the SCADA system at the treatment facility, used his knowledge
and access of the system to generate the spill [9].

As SCADA networks have slowly become integrated into corporate networks
with access to the Internet and company internetworks, the threat of internal unintentional
threats has increased. These threats occur due to inappropriate design of the networks,
such as the lack of firewalls between the SCADA and business LAN, and improper IT
procedures such as using default passwords and allowing broad access to the network to
individuals that don't require it. These threats pose a real danger to SCADA security.
The third type of threat is generated from computer viruses and worms that are
not targeted directly at industrial control systems (ICS). Improper application of security
updates and patches by IT personnel can cause failure in critical system equipment such
as safety systems and HMI computers.

These viruses can also open pathways for

intrusion to outside threats.
Finally, malicious actors are those who are targeting the ICS directly. This may
include hackers, hactivist, and nation-states. Many times these are well financed groups
with long backgrounds in malicious cyber activity. These attacks are difficult to prevent
due to their complexity and sophistication [10] [11] [12] [13].
Cyber vulnerabilities exist in many areas of the SCADA system. Attacks could
be directed on the HMI to provide the operator with incorrect information or take control
15

of the system. An attacker could also take control of the RTU directly, forcing pumps on
or off which could lead to water tanks overflowing or completely emptying. Both could
cause major disruption to the system. An attacker could gain access to the network to
launch an attack through interception of wireless data via RF radios, or through a
physical connection at a remote site.

C. Simulation of Water Treatment and Distribution

There are several technical areas in water resource management that require
modeling the water treatment and distribution process. Many of these focus on system
hydraulics and water quality. Since individual water systems are unique, meeting the
specific requirements of its user base, it is important to have an accurate method of
predicting the behavior of the system as changes are made, as well as identifying any
issues that occur as a result of a simulated cyber attack.

Several simulations have already been developed to address some of these issues
such as EPANET and KYPipe [14] [15]. EPANET was developed by the Environmental
Protection Agency as a way to perform extended period simulations of hydraulic and
water quality behavior within a pressurized pipe network. This software tracks the flow
of water in pipes, the pressure at nodes, the height of water in each tank, and the
concentration of chemicals throughout the network. The software can also simulate
water age and source tracing. KYPipe is similar to EP ANET in modeling the hydraulic
properties of a pipe network. It offers a graphical user interface (GUI) which allows
users to develop pipe system models easily. It can provide hydrant flow calculations and
water quality analysis in addition to many other features.
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Figure 2.8: KYPipe Simulation GUI

These software packages focus on the flow of water throughout the distribution
system in order to model water quality and hydraulic flow. These models and
simulations help researchers who are investigating methods to prevent and analyze how
chemicals can transverse the pipe network in the event that toxins were intentionally
introduced into the water system in order to cause harm to customers.

EPANET and KYPipe are excellent modeling packages for this type of research,
but do not address the specific needs required for testing prototypes directed at
preventing cyber attacks on the equipment itself. They only provide a numerical
analysis and output and do not actually address the system operation such as control of
pumps and sensor data throughout the network. They also do not provide any interface to
actual equipment controlling the system hardware, the HMI, or connect to the
communication network in any way.

The National SCADA Test-Bed program was established by the Department of
Energy (DOE) at Idaho and Sandia National Laboratories. This test-bed was designed to
17

address issues with cyber security in the nation's electricity, oil, and gas industries.
There has also been work in the development of test-beds that incorporate both a
virtualized component that works in unison with a hardware component. These
simulations allow for most of the intelligence and processing to occur within the software
while interfaces to physical SCADA components is accomplished with additional
hardware [16] [17] [18].

In order to develop a simulation that can be used to test the security preprocessor
developed at the University of Louisville as well as other prototypes, a simulation is
needed that incorporates components of EP ANET and KYPipe such as flow throughout
the pipe network and tank levels, but must also include control and simulated operation
of pumps and valves in the system, and can interface with actual SCADA components.
Also, these I/O parameters and analysis for the distribution side of the system must be
carried into the treatment side in order to form a better simulation. The combination of
all of these components will provide a robust model software package that can be easily
configured and reconfigured for testing purposes.

18

III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT

Due to the complexity of water systems, model development began by clearly
identify the necessary functions required for testing the target security device. Trying to
model all aspects of the treatment and distribution process would be extremely difficult
and beyond the scope of this project. To reduce the complexity, several assumptions are
made which are outlined for each subset of the water system. Although the systems are
explained separately, the final model includes all described.
A. Water Treatment

1. Calculations and Parameters
As outlined in Section 2.1, the water treatment process is normally comprised of five
steps: coagulation, sedimentation, filtration, disinfection, and water storage. In addition
to this, there must be a mechanism to bring water from the fresh water source (i.e. lake,
river) to the treatment facility. This is accomplished through the use of pumps and water
lines.

Most of the processes in the treatment phase are time oriented, and their

importance to the overall security of the system is less. There are a limited number of
processes which are needed to be included in the model in order to provide adequate
operations for testing. These are:
1) Provide a uninterrupted supply of fresh water to the treatment facility as needed
19

2) Provide chlorine to the filtered water for disinfection
3) Monitor the chlorination level of the water
4) Flow chlorinated drinkable water into the distribution system
Figure 3.1 shows the system components for the treatment system.

This model

assumes that water entering the treatment facility has passed through the coagulation,
sedimentation, and filtration stations without issue. A reservoir of filtered clear water is
stored for disinfection and then held until it is needed in the distribution system. In
addition, the fresh water source and the chlorine source is assumed to be infinite; that is
the water source will not empty as water is pumped into the treatment process and
chlorine will always be available for disinfection. All calculations are performed every
simulated one minute, which is defaulted to everyone second in true time.

This

simulation interval can be changed.

Distribution Storage
Tanks

Fresh Water Source

•

Denotes SCADA component

Figure 3.1: Water Treatment Model Flow Chart
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Variables are assigned for the flow rate of the pumps in and out of the
chlorination tank and the capacity of the tank. The volume of water (gallons) in the tank
is calculated based on its current volume, the flow of water in (flow rate of pump), and
the flow of water into the distribution system.

Vwater = Vcurrent

+

(Vflow in -

V[lOW out)t

Tanks in treatment facilities are usually in-ground with rectangular pnsm
geometry. Thus, the height of water in the reservoir can be calculated by
h

water

Vwater

=~,

tank

where Vwater is the volume of water in the tank in cubic feet (1 fe = 7.4805 gallons) and
A'tank

is the cross sectional area of the tank (l x w).
Various forms of chlorine are added to filtered water in order to kill micro-

organIsms.

The levels of chlorine are strictly regulated by the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency under the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 [19]. Table 1 shows the
maximum amount of chlorine allowable in drinking water.
Table I: Standards on Chlorine Levels 1191

Disinfectant

MRDLG

MRDL

Chloramine

4 milligrams per liter (mg/L) or 4 parts per
million (ppm)

4.0 mg/L or 4 ppm as an

Chlorine
Chlorine
Dioxide

annual average
4.0 mg/L or 4 ppm as an

4 mg/L or 4 ppm

annual average

0.8 mg/L or 800 parts per billion (ppb)
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0.8 mg/L or 800 ppb

From this rate the ideal concentration of chlorine between 3.5 and 4 ppm can be
set. The chlorination rate of the system is variable to maintain an acceptable chlorine
level as the flow rate of water in and out of the tank changes. Assume that the chlorine is
uniformly distributed throughout the water tank. Thus, the concentration of chlorine in
the water leaving the tank is equal to the concentration of the entire tank so that the
concentration of chlorine does not change based on the outflow.

Also assume the

concentration of the filtered water entering the tank to be zero.

The new chlorine

concentration of the tank is then calculated to be
Cl

where

MClold

concentration =

MClold
V water old

+

MClnew ,
V old+new

is the current amount of CI (mg) in the water,

Vwater old

is the amount of

water in the tank minus any that was pumped into the distribution system,

MCl new

is the

amount ofCI(mg) added during the time frame (chlorination rate), and VOld+new is the
volume of water in the tank minus any outflow into the distribution system and adding
any inflow (flow rate of pump). The chlorination can be configured to automatically
change based on concentration levels or set to be manually updated by the operator.
2. Required Model Inputs and Outputs
There is a limited amount of equipment required for the operation of the treatment
component of the simulation. A reservoir pump is required to provide water into the
treatment facility for treatment. A valve is also required at the pump site in order to
prevent backflow. A second pump is required to pump chlorine into the filtered water for
disinfection. A level sensor is also required in order to measure the amount of water in
the treatment tank.
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Corresponding parameters or variables are required for each of these components.
Each pump has a flow rate which should be configurable by the user. The maximum tank
level and ideal chlorine levels are also configurable by the user. Each calculated value
can be set to a default prior to running the simulation. Thus, the current treatment tank
level can be set to any value less than or equal to the maximum tank level parameter.
Each ofthe control (pumps, values) and sensor (tank levels) parameters has a
corresponding physical connection to the R TU, whether it is a digital or analog signal.
These connections are more thoroughly described in Chapter 4.
B. Water Distribution

1. Calculations and Parameters
Distribution systems vary widely based on the number of customers the water
system serves, as well as the geographical layout of the area. The number of tanks,
pumps, water lines, and even the topology of the water lines is independent to a specific
system. The distribution model needs to be robust enough to allow for complete testing
of the hardened security device while not being redundant in its features. Several
assumptions are made in order to accomplish this task. First, a branch architecture
system was chosen. This allows for pressure calculations at various points to be
performed easily. From the treatment model, it can be assumed that a separate storage
tank for treated water is not needed before being sent to distribution storage tanks. For
simulation purposes the pump and water lines leaving the chlorinated water tank are the
same as those that pump into the distribution system. Modeling a separate storage system
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will not improve the simulation. It was determined that two elevated water storage tanks
and their associated pumps and valves would be adequate for the distribution model.

Elevated Storage Tank

Chlorination Tank

Elevated Storage Tank

•

Denotes SCADA component
Denotes Pressure Sensor

Figure 3.2: Distribution Model Flow Chart

Variables are assigned to flow rates of each pump in the system and for the capacity of
each storage tank. Each tank is assumed to be a cylinder of varying height. Thus to
calculate the capacity (volume) of the tank the equation is:
Vcylinder = Trr2 h,

Where r is the radius of the tank and h is the varying height based on the capacity
variable assigned.
Water systems do not measure the amount of water in the storage tank: in gallons,
but instead in feet of water in the tank:. The height of the water in the tank: can be
measured by determining the static head pressure of the water using a sensor located in
the bottom of the standpipe ofthe tank. The pressure at any given point is dependent
only on the height of the column of water, and independent of the total volume of water
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(in this paper height of water is defined as the difference in elevation between the top of
the water column and the pressure sensor). For this reason set the radius ofthe tank to a
constant value and only change the height of the tank in order to increase capacity for the
model. Since the specific gravity of water is known, a linear relation can be made
between the measured pressure (psi) in the stand pipe and the height of the water in the
tarue

hwater

= 2.31 ft/psi

Flow in and out of the tank is measured in gallons/min. Thus, calculate the
volume of water in the tank based on its current volume in gallons, the flow of water into
the tank based on the flow rate of the pumps, and the flow of water out of the tank based
on demand.

Vwater = Vwater current

+

(Vf10W rate in -

Vf10w rate out)t

The cross-sectional area of the tank is set so the pressure can be inversely calculated by

p =

(Vwater)
Altank

C,

Where P is the pressure read by the sensor in psi, Vwater is the volume of water in the
tank in cubic feet (1 ft3 = 7.4805 gallons), A'tank is the cross sectional area of the tank in
square feet, and C is a constant conversion factor between pressure and height of water (1
psi /2.31 ft).

2. Required Model Inputs and Outputs

25

Based on the assumptions discussed previously, the equipment required for the
distribution component includes four pumps and four valves, two storage tanks and their
associated level meters. As with the treatment component, all of the parameters for pump
flow rates, maximum tank levels, and the default or starting values for current tanks
levels can be defined by the user prior to running the simulation. Also, each of these
parameters has a physical connection to the RTU used in testing as outlined in Chapter 4.
C. Water Demand
Several factors are considered to determine water usage in the system, 1) the
number of customers served, 2) the time of day the usage is occurring, 3) the number of
high use peripheral devices in the system (i.e. fire hydrants). Variable are assigned for
the number of customers for each branch of the distribution system, each being
independent of the other. For time of day data, a 24 hour demand curve, shown in Figure
3.3, was taken from previous work completed on a similar simulation [20]. Usage is
extracted from this curve and used to calculate current demand along with the number of
customers in each branch.
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Figure 3.3: Time of Day Demand Curve

For this basic 24 hour model, demand in the system is calculated to be

where D is the demand for each branch, N is the number of customers, and

is the

coefficient of usage based on the time of day. This graph, shown in Figure 3.3 , also
distinguishes winter from summer months.

However, seasonal information is not

currently used in the model.
High use devices such as fire hydrants place additional usage on the system.
These devices are random instantaneous surges on the demand of the distri.bution system
and are not time varying. To model these, a simple Boolean function is implemented
telling the system whether they are on or off. This generates peaks in the demand.

27

Pressure levels throughout the system are also an important consideration for a
simulation. For the customer, acceptable water pressure ranges between 40-70 psi. The
pressure throughout the system is determined based on the pressure at the water tower,
and the losses due to friction through pipes, valves, elbows, and meters. To simplify the
model we can assume straight pipes and no loses at branch points. This can be done
because line breaks and tank levels are the most important pressure aspects to consider
from a security aspect. Also, pipes are assumed to be at zero elevation with respect to the
pressure sensor at each tank. Calculations are made assuming uniform pipe types and
pipe diameters, thus friction loses are only dependent on distance from the tank.
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IV. SIMULATION SOFTWARE
Previous work on a water treatment and distribution system had been completed
at the University of Louisville.
security device.

This work was developed for earlier versions of a

The model was similar, including control of pumps and valves,

chlorination levels, and tank levels throughout the system. However, the hardware used
to interface to the RTU used in testing had limited 10, thus limiting the functionality of
the software simulation. The simulation also used two different programming languages
to create the full simulation [20]. In order to improve on this work, the simulation was
written in a single language, Microsoft Visual C#. This was chosen due to its ease of
integration with external hardware and familiarity with the programming software. New
hardware was also developed which described in Chapter 5. These changes allowed for a
more robust simulation to be developed.
The models outlined in Chapter 3 were implemented in C# code using Microsoft
Visual Studio (MVS) 2010. The designer feature of MVS allowed for a user-friendly
graphical user interface (GUI) to be developed that displayed all important calculations
and statuses of the simulation. The user interface also allows for simulation variables to
be entered as discussed in the following section. These values can be modified as the
simulation runs.
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1. Simulation Parameters and Controls

The first component of the simulation contains the basic parameters required to
run the simulation. These include:
l. Hour of Day

2. Minute of Day
3. Customers
4. Belknap Outflow
5. Medical Outflow
The hour and minute of day is defaulted to 0 but can be changed to any acceptable
value before the simulation is started. As the simulation runs, the minute of day will
increment once per second as defined by a timer running in the simulation. After 60
seconds in real time (60 minutes in the simulation), the hour of day will increment by
one. This timing sequence can be changed by changing the timer settings in the code to
allow a simulated minute and hour to be configured to any real world timing interval.
The timing structure of the simulation is important if the model needs to replicate real
world events in which the timing mechanism is crucial. If the simulation needs to run in
real-time, the timer in the simulation should be set to true time or a 1: 1 ratio. This would
correspond to a timer tick every 60 seconds.

For simulations were the chlorine

concentration and rate of addition is crucial this timing scheme should be used.
The number of customers is also defaulted to 0, but should be changed prior to
running the simulation. The number of customers and time of day are used to calculate
the outflow for the two distribution subsystems, Medical and Belknap. This naming
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convention is used for the two downtown campuses of the University of Louisville. The
outflows are calculated using the formula outlined in Chapter 3.
The Parameters section also contains the simulation controls. These include:
I. Connect
2. Disconnect
3. Run Model
4. Stop
5. Reset
The front panel for the parameters section is shown in Figure 4.1. The connect
button opens the serial port defined in part by the user and within the code of the
simulation software. The disconnect button closes this port. The COM port number can
be entered by the user into the COM Port textbox available in the parameters section.
The default value is "I"; indicating "COM1" will be addressed when establishing a
connection. All of the other parameters such baud rate, parity, stop bits, and flow control
are defined within the code of the software and cannot be easily changed by the user.
This is to prevent modifications of these parameters which will prevent a correct
connection with the hardware. In order to run the simulation, the communication port
must be open. The simulation uses the System.lO.Ports namespace in Microsoft Visual
Studio C#, which contains classes needed to establish a serial communications
connection to the external hardware.
ASCII characters and sequences of characters are passed between the software
and hardware. These characters are used to initialize hardware settings, and exchange the
status of pumps, tank levels, chlorination levels, and any other important information
between the two components ofthe simulation. The COM value textbox displays the last
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ASCII sequence received from the hardware. This can be used for troubleshooting issues
with the simulation or for simply monitoring the exchange of data between the software
and hardware. The simulation is configured to only run once a connection is established,
i.e. the simulation control buttons (RUN, STOP, and RESET) are not enabled unless a
connection is made.
With a connection established, the run button becomes enabled. When pressed,
an initialize character is sent from the software to the hardware, which resets any analog
or discrete value to their defaults. The hardware then responds with the status of all of
the discrete inputs from the RTU which are updated in the software. After initialization,
the model timer starts which causes the time of day values to increment and all other
calculations to occur. Calculations are updated every simulated minute. The Stop button
stops the model timer and all calculations. Reset sets all analog values in the simulation
to their defaults and sends a new initialization character to the hardware.

Parameters

o

Hour of Day

Belknap Outflow

o

Min of Day

Medical Outflow

o

Customers

Com Value

Connect
Run Model

I(
I(

Disconnect
Stop

I
I

-

r-(

R-e-se-t

......

Figure 4.1: Parameters and Simulation Controls

2. Water Treatment Component
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The water treatment component is comprised of two simulated pumps: one for
pumping water into the treatment tank (RES Pump) and one for pumping chlorine into
the treatment tank:. The reservoir pump includes a valve that opens and closes as the
pump turns on and off.

All of these components have a Boolean logic which is

transmitted from the hardware to the simulation via the communication port. When the
pumps are active, the pump symbol and valve change to a green color; when there are not
active they are represented by a red symbol.
Using the formulas outlined in Chapter 3, the tank level and chlorine level in the
tank is calculated when the simulation is running. The max tank level, current tank level,

and pump flow rates can be adjusted by the user before the simulation runs. The default
levels are shown in Figure 4.2. Chlorine level and tank level are analog outputs from the
simulation software to the hardware which can be read by the RTU and HMI if desired.

600

Figure 4.2: Water Treatment Simulation Component

3. Water Distribution Component

The water distribution component is comprised of four pumps and four valves,
flow parameters for each of the pumps, and two tanks and their associated tank levels.
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The tank levels are calculated using the formulas outlined in Chapter 3. The pump
statuses are a Boolean logic controlled by the simulation hardware connected to the RTU.
When the pumps are active, the pump symbol and valve symbol change to green; when
there are not active they are represented by a red symbol.
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MEDICAL

400
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400
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Figure 4.3: Water Distribution Simulation Component

4. Distribution Adjustments and Pressure Values

An important aspect to the simulation is to be able to adjust the normal operating

conditions of the water system. This section allows for instantaneous spikes in outflow
from each distribution subsystem as well as monitoring of pressure in the lines and a
given distance from the elevated tank. As described in the previous chapter, assumptions
are made that the entire pipe network is distributed on an even elevation and with a given
pipe diameter and type. Thus, the pressure drop can be calculated as described using a
simple linear reduction based on distance. These parameters cannot be changed via the
34

GUI by the user, but can only be changed within the code of the simulation. Each
subsystem allows for two virtual pressure nodes to be placed at any distance from the
tank. Fire hydrants provide a method of creating an instantaneous surge in outflow and
the flow rate of the hydrant can be modified by the user. The pressure level at each node
is an analog output from the simulation software to the hardware and can be read by the
RTU and HMI if desired.
This section also contains four control buttons that can create simulated breaks in
the pipe network at each pressure node. If the break button is used, the pressure at that
node drops to O. The corresponding analog output will also read O. This can be used by
the HMI to signal to the operator that there is an issue in the system.
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Figure 4.4: Distribution Adjustments and Pressure Values

The completed simulation GUI is shown in Figure 4.5
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Figure 4.5: Graphical Interface of Treatment and Distribution Simulation

2. Human Machine Interface CHMD

In order for the RTU to function appropriately and the simulation to be used, an
HMI is needed to provide a method of controlling the RTUs outputs and reading the
inputs. As described in Chapter 2, the common SCADA protocol for communicating
with most RTUs is the MODBUS protocol. This is the case for the VersaTRAK used in
this research, which allowed for both MODBUS RTU and MODBUS ASCII, two
standard forms of the protocol. An HMI is needed which can communicate via these
standards. Many off the shelf products were available, including several freeware
options.
After testing the functionality and adaptability of some of these options, it was
determined that a customized HMI could be developed using National Instruments
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Laboratory Virtual Instrumentation Engineering Workbench or LabVIEW®. LabVIEW
is a graphical, 'G', programming language that is used to expedite the development of
programs for data acquisition, instrumentation control, and industrial process control. A
MODUBUS virtual instrument (VI) is available as an add-on which reduced the amount
of time to develop an HMI for use with the simulation and RTU. The HMI uses a VISA
resource subVI to establish a connection to the RTU using the appropriate parameters.
The HMI references this resource in the front panel as shown in Figure 4.6.
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I

Flow Control

~ INone

I
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INon~

Mod~
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Slav~Add~s

nm~ut

110000

I

Figure 4.6: VlSA Resource Parameters

Modifications to the existing interface have been made to increase the number of
digital output controls as well as to read multiple input registers from the RTU which
store the analog data from the simulation hardware. Also, the number of digital inputs
has been expanded in order to match those of the RTU. Figure 4.7 shows the Boolean
control buttons on the front panel of the HMI for the four coils used on the RTU. Figure
4.8 shows the twelve digital input indicators associated with the digital inputs of the

RTU.
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Figure 4.7: Digital and Analog Output Control

Slave Discrete Inputs 2

Figure 4.8: Digital Inputs from RTU
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V. SIMULATION HARDWARE

This chapter describes specialized hardware which was designed, developed, and
tested to support a more robust simulator for SCADA security evaluations. The hardware
works alongside the software simulation component but was designed so that it can
interface with other software developed for similar tasks easily_
1. RTU and 110

The second component to the simulation is the hardware, which is used to
interface to the RTU used for testing of the hardened security device. For this research
project, the VersaTRAK® mIPm RTU/Controller is used. It is equipped with 12 discrete
inputs, four discrete outputs, eight analog inputs, and two analog outputs. The RTU is
connected to a computer equipped with a HMI, which is used to turn on digital outputs
and display the status of both digital and analog inputs.

The security of the

communication between the HMI and the RTU is the area of interest for security testing.
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Figure 5.1: RTU used for Testing

In a water treatment and distribution system, the RTU will be the controller
connected to the relays, which turn pumps on and off, close valves, and to sensors that
monitor tank levels and other system conditions. The purpose of the simulation is to
replace the pumps, valves, and sensors, with virtualized components, which are
accomplished in the software portion of the simulation. In order to interface with the
RTU; however additional hardware is needed.
The types of inputs and outputs, both discrete and analog, need to be assessed
before any hardware design begins. Reviewing the simulation and models outlines, it is
determined that the I/O shown is Table 5.1 is required. Input/output listed in the table is
from the point-of-view of the simulation hardware that interfaces with the RTU. It is
worth noting that the specific RTU used in this research is not equipped with enough
digital outputs (coils) or analog inputs to accommodate all of the variables used in the
simulation. Instead of reducing the functionality of the simulation, the physical
connections between the simulation hardware and the RTU will simply be left
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unconnected. In the event a new R TU is acquired, the connections can be made and the
simulation can be fully controlled.
Table 5..
1· Simulation Hardware 110

Description
Pump lA Belknap
Pump 2A Belknap
Pump 1B Medical
Pump 2B Medical
Tank Belknap Level
Tank Medical Level
Treatment Tank Level
Chlorine Concentration
Res Pump
Chlorine Pump
Pressure Nodel Belknap
Pressure Node 2 Belknap
Pressure Node 1Medical
Pressure Node 2Medical

Input I Output
Input
Input
Input
Input
Output
Output
Output
Output
Input
Input
Output
Output
Output
Output

Analog or Discrete
Discrete
Discrete
Discrete
Discrete
Analog
Analog
Analog
Analog
Discrete
Discrete
Analog
Analog
Analog
Analog

2. Hardware Circuitry and Controller

With the required 110 determined, and a method for controlling the RTU
developed, the hardware required to interface from the simulation software to the RTU
had to be developed. This hardware needed to be able to accomplish the following tasks:
1. Communicate over a RS-232 serial connection to the software
2. Store analog data from the simulation (i.e. tank levels, line pressure,
chlorination levels)
3. Output analog signal to the RTU based on stored analog data from
software
4.

Read digital output signals from the RTU and store as Boolean variables

5. Send Boolean values from (4) to software via communication port
6. Output digital signal to RTU (for future use)
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In order to accomplish these tasks, an embedded controller was required.

A

Microchip® PIC 18F8722 microcontroller was used in order to process discrete and
analog values from the R TV and communicate them to the software simulation via a RS232 serial connection. The microcontroller was also used to process serial data received
from the software simulation and output discrete and analog values to the RTU. The
microcontroller serial port interfaced to a MAX232 TTL level-shifter in order to match
appropriate signal voltage levels between the microcontroller and computer. The serial
connection was full-duplex enabling the rnicrocontroller to send and receive data
simultaneously.
Additional electronics and circuits were required in order to interface from the
rnicrocontroller to the RTV. The input voltage range on the discrete I/O for the
microcontroller was 0-5 V and the range on the RTV was 0-15 V. In order to prevent
over voltage on the microcontroller and ensure a minimum threshold voltage for the

RTV, a transistor switching circuit was used.

Yout

Vout

Q1

01
2N39r

Vin

Vin

a)

" 39(

b)

Figure 5.2: Transistor Switch Circuits
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Figure 5.2 shows the two transistor circuits used in order to convert the digital
output voltages between the RTU and microprocessor. Figure 5.2a was used for signals
originating at the microprocessor and figure 5.2b was used for signals originating at the
RTU. In both cases, Yin was connected to the output pin of the originating device. When
Yin was low (or OV) no current flowed from the collector, which was connected to R2 in

the figure, and the emitter, which was connected to ground. Thus, there is no voltage
drop across R2 and the output voltage Vout is equal to the supply voltage, 15V or 5V
depending on the case. When Yin is high, the base current becomes non-zero so the
collector current becomes non-zero as well. For a 2N3904 npn transistor, the voltage
drop across the base and collector is 0.7V. Thus the voltage drop across R2 is equal to
the supply voltage minus 0.7V. The output Vout is then equal to 0.7V which is equivalent
to a logical 0 or off. The transistor switch operates on an inverting topology [21].
The PIC 18F8722 did not include any analog outputs, similar to most
microcontrollers. In order to interface the simulation to the RTU, a method of generating
analog outputs for the tank levels, chlorine levels, and line pressure had to be developed.
It was determined that there were two methods to accomplish this goal.

The first option utilized the microcontroller's pulse-width modulation (PWM)
modules.

PWM is a common method used for digital-to-analog conversion (DAC).

PWM is the generation of a series of pulses at a fixed amplitude, period, and frequency.
The duty cycle of the signal is defined by the width of each pulse which can be varied.
Figure 5.3 shows a PWM waveform. By adding a low-pass filter to a PWM signal, an
analog output signal can be generated. The output voltage is proportional to the average
time the PWM signal is spent in the "HIGH" state. For example, a 50% duty cycle would
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correlate to a 2.5V analog output if the supply voltage was 5V as in the case with the
microcontroller used in the hardware.

A passive filter is adequate to produce an

acceptable output if the frequency of the PWM signal is high enough. If not, an active
filter design can be used [22].
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Figure 5.3: Pulse Width Modulation Waveform
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Figure 5.4: DAC using PWM and Passive Filter
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PIC 17C42

Figure 5.5: DAC using PWM and Active Filter

A second method to creating an external DAC is to use a resistor network which
is driven by digital outputs [22]. This method is often referred to as an R2R ladder. In a
typical application, eight discrete outputs are wired to a ladder configuration of resistors,
with the resistors wired in series with the output pins being 2X the value as the rail
resistors. This provides an equivalent 8-bit DAC. Figure 5.6 shows a single port R2R
configuration with a microcontroller similar to the one used in this project. Figure 5.7
shows the output response of the R2R ladder.
The PIC18F8722 has mne I/O ports, each 8 bit, or equivalently, 72 possible
digital I/O. Since a single port can support the necessary digital inputs required for the
simulation, the remaining eight can be used for analog outputs, exactly the number of
analog inputs available on the RTU. For this reason, and the limited number of PWM
modules on the PIC, the R2R ladder options were used for this project.
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Although the simulation does not currently include reading analog outputs from
the RTUs two AD ports, consideration was made in adding this option.
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The

microcontroller does have 16, 10-bit analog-to-digital converters (ADC) that can operate
with a single-ended or differential voltage reference. However, as with most industrial
controls equipment, the RTU used a 4-20mA current loop for analog outputs. In order to
convert from current to voltage an operational amplifier circuit is required.

+

Figure 5.8: Current to Voltage Converter

Figure 5.8 shows the current to voltage converter circuit required.

Vin

is connected to the

RTU. As the current from the current loop increases, Vout increases. This allows the
microcontroller to have a voltage input based on a current output from the RTU. Rf must
be a precision resistor for this circuit to function properly but the exact resistor values can
vary due to the high impedance of the RTU VO. [21].

Figure 5.9 shows the overall

conversions and connections to interface the RTU and microcontroller.

Figure 5.10

shows a simplified schematic of the microcontroller and additional electronics.
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Figure 5.9: Block Diagram of I/O Interfaces with Microcontroller

Figure 5.10: Simplified Schematic ofI/O and Communication Circuits with Microcontroller

An additional software component was needed in order to program the
microcontroller to process data received from the simulation software and on I/O pins
connected to the transistor switches. A C compiler from CCS Inc® was used to program
and load the code onto the microcontroller. This code was simplistic, toggling output
48

pins when specific ASCII characters were received on the serial port, and sending ASCII
characters to the simulation depending on the state of its digital input ports.

A

PIC18F8722 development kit from CCS was used for compatibility with the
programming software and ease of integration.
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VI. TESTING
This chapter presents results from testing the simulator for proper operations, and
also some representative SCADA security testing indicative of have the simulator will be
used.
A. Software Simulation Testing
There are several items that were tested in order to check the functionality of the
water treatment and distribution simulation. Testing included the simulation software,
simulation hardware, the VersaTRAK RTU, and the LabVIEW HMI. The simulation
software was run on a Windows 7 PC located in the Information Security Research
Laboratory at the University of Louisville. The software was initially run in Microsoft
Visual Studio so that any issues with the program could be debugged. After completion,
an executable file was generated.

Testing of the simulation was divided into the

following test criteria:
I.
II.

Communication setup
Model calculations without external inputs (i.e. time of day, outflow)

III.

Software indicator functionality from hardware outputs (i.e. pump status)

IV.

Model calculations with external inputs (i.e. tank levels with pumps
running)

V.

Hardware signal generation from software variables (i.e. analog outputs to
RTU)
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1. Serial Port Connection Testing

The first aspect to testing the simulation software is to make sure that a
connection can be made on the COM port specified in the parameters section. In cases
where the PC has an available COM port on board, typically COM1 , this can be
accomplished by simply connecting a serial cable from the COM port located on the back
of the machine to the DB9 connector available on the simulation hardware breadboard
and verifying that the COM port number entered in the simulation matches the available
port of the machine. In situations where the PC does not have a standard serial port, a
USB to serial converter cable can be purchased. Once the physical connection has been
made and power is provided to the hardware, the connect button can be pressed and the
simulation control buttons will become enabled.
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Figure 6.1; Control Buttons before Connection Established

When the connect button is pressed, the software will send a sequence of ASCII
characters to the simulation hardware. The hardware will then respond with a sequence
of ASCII characters which will be displayed in the COM value textbox of the software.
This will indicate that a successful connection has been established. If the connection
fails, an error message will appear on the screen.
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Figure 6.2: Example Error Message during Connection Process

2. Model Calculations without External Inputs

With a successful connection established, the remammg elements of the
simulation can be tested. Pressing the "RUN" button will start the simulation and enable
the "STOP" and "RESET" control buttons. As soon as the simulation begins, the "Min
of Day" text box should begin to increment each second. To test the simulation model
calculations without inputs from the hardware, the inputs to the transistor switching
circuits were disconnected from the RTU, generating an "OFF" status for all of the
pumps. This test examined the functionality of the model timer, and calculations of the
outflow based on time of day and number of customers, the treatment tank level, and
chlorine level in the tank.
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Figure 6.3: Outflow Calculations
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Figure 6.4: Chlorine and Tank Level Calculation

3. Software Indicators

The status of the pumps in the simulation is dependent on the inputs to the
simulation hardware from the RTD. When a discrete output of the RTU is turned on
using the HMI, the transistor switching circuit will pull an input pin on the simulation
micro controller low. The rnicrocontroller will then send a character indicating the status
of that pump which will change the color of the pump and value in the software. If the
pump is running, the tank level will change in accordance with the formulas outlined in
Chapter 3. As shown in Figure 5.5, turning on discrete outputs 1-3 turn on one pump of
the Belknap Tank and both pumps of the Medical tank. The forth output is connected to
the reservoir pump. As noted previous, the specific RTU used in testing is not equipped
with enough discrete outputs to take full advantage of the simulation. Testing the other
digital input based components of the hardware and software was completed by pulling
the transistor switching circuits "HIGH" and "LOW" directly.
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Figure 6.5: RTU Outputs Controlling Simulation Pumps

4. Model Calculations with External Input

As seen in Figure 5.3, when both pumps on tank Belknap are running, the rate at
which the tank fills is increased. It is also important to note the flow rates of each pump
which can be adjusted by the user must be set in proper proportions. If the flow rate of
the reservoir pump is set to that of each of the elevated tank pump flow rates then the
treatment tank will drop dramatically. This will also have a direct impact on the chlorine
level in the tank.
It is important to note that all calculations in the simulation are made with each

tick of the model timer. Pump statuses are updated based on ASCU characters received
from the simulation hardware. When a character is received, an interrupt occurs which

54

reads in the character or characters on the serial port buffer and then analyzes the
character to perform the appropriate operation. This execution occurs much faster than
the 1 second interval between ticks. For that reason, there is no noticeable delay in the
update of the pump status and the calculation of variables in the program.

170
Mar_Love

PUMP]

400

400

Figure 6.6: RTU Control of All Pumps

5. Hardware Output

On each tick of the model timer, the new value of all variables (analog values) in
the program is sent over the communication port to the simulation hardware after the
completion of their calculation. The microcontrol1er parses these values and updates the
output accordingly. Since the RTU and HMI have no understanding of what the signal
voltages received are in relation to (i.e. height, pressure), the values passed to the
microcontroller from the software are a ratio of the current value to the maximum value.
This fraction is then used to calculate the output of the associated PORT in order to
generate the proportional analog signal to the RTU.
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The R2R ladder output was

measured to ensure that the proper voltage was being supplied to the RTU as seen in
Figure 6.7.
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Figure 6.7: Scope Trace of R2R Ladder Output

B. SCADA Security Testing

Testing of the simulation with the hardened remote security preprocessor was
completed to demonstrate the full functionality of the simulation. The simulation allows
for both a virtual and physical realization of the operation of the SCADA system (i.e.
status of pumps, tank levels, chlorine levels) as cyber attacks are carried out on the
SCADA system. A compromised SCADA network was used in which a rogue computer
gained access to the network and was able to issue MODBUS commands. For testing,
the following scenarios were examined:
1. Turn on pump without security device (Write coils attack)
2. Falsify discrete input data without security device (Read request attack)
3. Turn on pump with security device (Write coils attack)
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4. Falsify discrete input data with security device (Read request attack)
In scenario 1, a write coil command was issued on a compromised network from

an unauthorized computer. In an ideal case, the RTU would only authorize and execute
this command when issued from an authorized HMI. Without a security device in place,
the command was successfully executed and a simulated pump was activated, filling one
of the storage tanks in the simulation as seen in Figure 5.7. The HMI on the SCADA
network indicated no pumps running as shown in Figure 5.8.
BelKNAP

200
Max Tank Level

500

Figure 6.8: Unauthorized Pump Turn On (Write Coils Attack)
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Figure 6.9: HMl Showing No Coils Written During Attack

A read request attack was also tested. In this scenario, a read discrete inputs
request was issued from the MTUIHMI. The unauthorized computer intercepted this
command and issued a false response indicating a true value for one of the inputs. For
testing purposes, the simulation hardware was programmed to turn on a digital output of
the simulation when a digital input from the RTU went high. When a pump was turned
on using the HMI, a coil would go high on the RTU which would be detected by the
simulation. The simulation would then output a high value back into the R TU which
could be read by the HMI. Essentially a feedback loop was created to verify the
simulation hardware understood to turn on a pump. Figure 5.9 shows the HMI which
indicated that no coils have been written, yet shows a high status on a digital input.
Figure 5.10 shows the simulation, also indicating no coils (pumps) have been turned on"
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Figure 6.10: HMI Showing No Coils Written but a Pump Running (Discrete Input High)
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Figure 6.11: Simulation Showing No Pumps Running

Both of these scenarios were repeated with the security device in place (refer to
Figure 1.1). In these cases, the security device challenged the write and read commands.
Since the commands were not authorized, the MODBUS messages were not passed to the
RTU thus no execution occurred in any part of the system including the simulation.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Traditional IT security measures are insufficient for securing SCADA systems.
The development of new SCADA security devices and approaches requires sector
specific simulations for assessing and evaluation new SCADA security technology. The
University of Louisville is currently developing a hardened remote terminal security preprocessor. In order to test this device, a water treatment and distribution simulation was
designed due to the low cost of implementation and the versatility that a virtualized test
bed offers.
Background research was conducted in order to more completely understand the
operations of both the treatment process and distribution process that occur in the water
system. Assumptions were made in order to focus the development of the simulation to
best fit the testing criteria of the security device. Models for both the treatment and
distribution subsystems were developed. These models were implemented in a userfriendly GUI based software simulation.

Calculations and system statuses were

transmitted over a serial connection to hardware designed to work in conjunction with the
software component. This hardware interfaced multiple discrete and analog I/O to a R TU
used for testing the security device. Testing of the complete system assured that the
simulation performed according to specifications and provided adequate testing vectors
for the security system.
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There are several additions to the simulation that are planned that will increase the
functionality of the system.

First, the RTUs analog outputs can be used to control

variables within the simulation software. The circuit design for interfacing the R TU and
microcontroller in this manner has already been completed and outlined in previous
chapters. The chlorination rate of the simulation is currently controlled by the user of the
software. A slight modification to the code would allow for the HMI and RTU to control
this variable for example.
The VersaTRAK RTU used in testing was not running any logic; its inputs and
outputs were read and controlled by the HMI. Additional testing should be performed
with a RTU running some type of operational logic.

Work has been started on

programming an Allen Bradley PLC using the associated RSLogix software. A simple
ladder logic program can be developed that will allow the RTU to automatically tum on
and off pumps as the tank levels change much like a typical system would do as outlined
in chapter two. This would provide a fully functional testing system for cyber security
devices that are being developed.
The water treatment and distribution simulation outlined will be used as a testbed
for new devices aimed at securing SCADA systems. It offers a large amount of VO that
can be connected to a wide variety of RTUs that are used in the field today. Using a
simple serial interface between the software and hardware, the system can be easily
transported and set up in laboratories or industrial settings for additional testing. This
testing system will offer a unique method of testing new cyber security devices and offer
insight into any issues or problems that should be resolved before the device is deployed
in a real world setting.
62

REFERENCES

[1] T M Chen, "Stuxnet, the real start of cyber warfare," Network, IEEE, vol. 24, no. 6,
pp. 2-3, March 2010. [Online]. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet
[2] J Graham and J Hieb, "Designing Security-Hardened Microkemels for Field
Devices," IFIP International Federationfor Information Processing, vol. 290, no.
Critical Infrastructure Protection II, pp. 129-140,2008.
[3] US EPA. (2012, March) United States Environmental Protection Agency. [Online].
http://water .epa. govII earn/kidsldrinkingwater/watertreatmentplant index.cfm
[4] US EPA. (2012, March) United States Environmental Protection Agency. [Online].
http://water .epa. gOY Ilawsregs/ruiesregsl sdwaltcrldi stri butionsystems.cfm
[5] MODBUS-IDA, "MODBUS Messaging on TCP/IP Implementation Guide," 2006.
[6] AutoMatrixInc. (2012) AutoMatrixInc. [Online].
http://automatrixinc.com/projects.html
[7] One Hundred Nineth Congress House of Representatives, "SCADA Systems and the
Terrorist Threat: Protecting the Nation's Critical Control System," in Joint Hearing
before the Suncommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
Cyber Security with the Subcommittee on Emergency Prepardness, Science, and
Technology, of the Committee on Homeland Security, Washington D.C., 2005.
[8] Joseph Weiss, "Electronic Threats to Industrial Control Systems," in Protecting
Industrial Control Systems from Electronic Threats. New York, NY, United States:
Momentum Press, 2010, ch. 6, pp. 43-51.
[9] Marshall Abrams and Joe Weiss, "Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack
Case Study-Maroochy Water Services, Australia," Case Study 2008.
[10] V M Igure, S A Laughter, and R D Williams, "Security Issues in SCADA
Networks," Computers and Security, vol. 25, no. 7, pp. 498-506, 2006.

63

[11] A. Miller, "Trends in Process Control Systems Security," IEEE Security and Privacy
Magazine, vol. 3, no. 5, pp. 57-60, September 2005.
[12] D. Geer, "Security of Critical Control Systems Sparks Concern," Computer, vol. 3,
no. 5, pp. 20-23, January 2006.
[13] T. Brown, "Security in SCADA Systems: How to Handle the Growing Menace to
Process Automation," Computing and Control Engineering Journal, vol. 16, no. 3,
pp. 42-47, 2005.
[14] Lewis A. Rossman, "EPANET 2 Users Manual," Cincinnati, OH, 2000.
[15] KYPipe, "KYPipe 2012 Users Manual," Lexington, KY, 2010.
[16] C. M. Davis et aI., "SCADA Cyber Security Testbed Development," in North
American Power Symposium, 2006, pp. 483-488.
[17] Carlos Queiroz, Abdun Mahmood, Jiankun Hu, Zahir Tari, and Xinghuo Yu,
"Building a SCADA Security Testbed," in Third International Conference on
Network and System SEcurity, 2009, pp. 357-364.
[18] Justin Adams, Jeffrey Hieb, James Graham, and Rammohan Ragade, "A Water
System Simulation for Testing Security Enhancements to SCADA Field Sevices," in
International Conference on Computer Applications in Industry and Engineering,
2011, pp. 305-310.
[19] US EPA. (2012, March) US Environmental Protection Agency. [Online].
http://water.epa.gov/drinkicontaminants/basicinfom1ation/disinfectants.cfm
[20] Justin Adams, "A WATER DISTRIBUTION AND TREATMENT SIMULATION
FOR TESTING CYBER SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS FOR WATER SECTOR
SCADA SYSTEMS," Computer Engineering and Computer Science, Thesis 2011.
[21] Paul Horowitz and Winfield Hill,.: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
[22] Rob Stein and John Day, "DA Conversion Using PWM and R-2R Ladders to
Generate Sine and DTMF Waveforms," 2002.

64

APPENDIX I - Glossary

ADC - Analog to Digital Converter
ADU - Application Data Unit
ASCII - American Standard Code for Information Interchange
COM - Communication
DAC - Digital to Analog Converter
DAQ - Data AcQuisition
EPA-Environmental Protection Agency
GUI - Graphical User Interface
HMI - Human Machine Interface
I/O - Inputs/Outputs
IP - Internet Protocol
Lab VIEW - Laboratory Virtual Instrumentation Engineering Workbench
LAN - Local Area Network
MTU - Master Terminal Unit
MVS - Microsoft Visual Studio
PC - Personal Computer
PDU - Protocol Data Unit
PWM - Pulse Width Modulation
PLC - Programmable Logic Controller
POTS - Plain Old Telephone Service
PPB - Parts Per Billion
PPM - Parts Per Million
PSI - Pounds per Square Inch
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R2R - Resistor to Resistor
RES - Reservoir
RF - Radio Frequency
RFC - Request for Comments
RTU - Remote Terminal Unit
SCADA - Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
TCP/IP - Transmission control Protocol/Internet Protocol
TTL - Transistor-Transistor Logic
USB - Universal Serial Bus
VI - Virtual Instrument
VISA - Virtual Instrument Software Architecture
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APPENDIX II - Mathematical Equations for Simulation Variables

Vwater = V current

+

(VIlow in -

VIlow out)t

is the volume of water in the tank in cubic feet (1 fe = 7.4805 gallons)

Vwater

is the current volume of water in tank

Vcurrent
VIlow in

is the flow of water into the tank

VIlowout

is the flow of water out of the tank

Vwater

hwater

= -A-:-'-tank

hwater
A'tank

is the height of the water in the tank
is the cross sectional area ofthe tank (l x w)

CI
concentration

=

MClold
V water old

+

MClnew
V old+new

is the current amount of CI (mg) in the water
Vwater old is the amount of water in the tank minus any that was pumped into the
distribution system
MCl new is the amount ofCI (mg) added during the time frame (chlorination rate)
Vold+new is the volume of water in the tank minus any outflow into the distribution
system and adding any inflow (flow rate of pump)
MClold

Vcylinder =

nr2 h,

r is the radius of the tank
h is the varying height based on the capacity variable assigned

hwater =

2.31 it/psi
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p = (Vwater) C,
A'tank

P is the pressure read by the sensor in psi
Vwater is the volume of water in the

tank in cubic feet (1 fe

=

7.4805 gallons)

A'tank is the cross sectional area of the tank in square feet

C is a constant conversion factor between pressure and height of water (1 psi / 2.31 ft).

D = N

* UTOD,

D is the demand for each branch
N is the number of customers
UTODis

the coefficient of usage based on the time of day
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APPENDIX ill - Microcontroller and Electronics Information

PICt8F8527
PIC 18F81>22
PIC 18F8627
PICt8F8722

PIC18F8722 Microcontroller Pin Definitions
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2 3904

TO-92

ESC

Absolute Maximum Ratings·
Symbol

Ta

= 25°C unless otherwise noted
Value

Units

V CEO

Collector-Emitter Voltage

40

V

Vcso

Collector-Base Voltage

60

V

VEBO

Emitter-Base Voltage

6.0

V

200

rnA

-55 to +150

°C

Ic
TJ. Tstg

Parameter

Collector Current - Continuous
Operating and Storage Junction Temperature Range

2N3904 NPN Transistor

Vos TRI

Vos
V+

UC
fl C

= tlO comiECT

OPt77 Ultra Precision Op-Amp Pin Definitions
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DIP/SO

CAPACITANCE (11F)
DEVICE

(1

MAX220
MAX232
MAX232A

G2

C3 C4 C5
0.33 0.33 033
1.0 1.0 10 1.0

o.orr 0.33
10
0.1

G.l

01

0.1

0.1

MAX232 Driver/Receiver

12345

o

o

DB9 Connecter Pinout
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